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1 Introduction
Equal treatment of individuals as well as of alternatives are among the core principles
of democratic decision-making. Equal treatment of individuals is usually ensured by the
anonymity condition, which requires the social choice to be invariant under renaming in-
dividuals. The typical condition to ensure equal treatment of alternatives, on the other
hand, is neutrality, which requires the social choice to change in compliance with renaming
of alternatives.
The logical incompatibility between anonymity and neutrality while ensuring an untied
outcome is among the most well-known results in social choice theory. Moulin (1980, 1991)
characterizes the sizes of social choice problems that admit anonymous and neutral social
choice rules (SCRs) that are resolute, i.e., that choose a unique alternative at any profile.
More precisely, a social choice problem with n individuals and m alternatives admits an
anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCR if and only if m cannot be written as the sum of some
divisors of n that exceed 1 (Moulin, 1991). When (Pareto) efficiency is imposed on top of
anonymity and neutrality, this requirement is strengthened to “n not having a prime divisor
less than or equal to m ” (Moulin, 1980).1
How severe is this tension between anonymity and neutrality? Campbell and Kelly (2015)
show the rarity of cases where anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCRs exist: when the
number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, only a finite number
of social choice problems admit anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCRs. Also, when the
number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, a
resolute SCR is anonymous and neutral only if it chooses alternatives that are in the bottom
half of preferences of all individuals. Adding efficiency on top of anonymity and neutrality
restricts the sizes of social choice problems that admit anonymous, neutral, and resolute
SCRs even further.
Do these results leave any hope for guaranteeing equal treatment of voters and alternatives
for untied collective choice? We reject pessimism by identifying a weakening of neutrality
which allows a vast range of possibilities while pandering to a very significant aspect of neutral
treatment of alternatives. This new condition that we call consequential neutrality requires
that all alternatives are chosen at the same number of preference profiles. The moderated
character consequential neutrality possesses puts forward an ex-ante fairness property that
is more outcome-oriented compared to the classical neutrality approach that entails a more
procedure-oriented equal treatment of alternatives.
We start by analyzing the structure of irresoluteness imposed by anonymity, neutrality,
and efficiency, a previously overlooked matter. We generalize the characterization of Moulin
1Zwicker (2016) delivers an introduction to the theory of voting where major results regarding anonymity
and neutrality are included.
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(1980) by completely describing the sizes of unavoidable ties under these conditions (Theorem
2). This generalization paves the way to identifying a method to refine SCRs that are “more
irresolute than necessary”, while anonymity, efficiency, and neutrality are preserved (Theorem
3).
We then turn to our analysis of consequential neutrality for resolute SCRs. We start with
counting the number of resolute SCRs that are neutral and those that are consequentially
neutral (CN) as a function of the size of the social choice problem (Theorem 4). An analytical
comparison of these two numbers seems beyond reach, so we take a computational approach
where we calculate the numbers of resolute SCRs in each class for a small set of values of the
size of the social choice problem. These numerical exercises that we report on show strong
tendencies in the comparison of the numbers of CN and neutral SCRs, hence we conjecture
that the class of resolute SCRs that are CN is considerably larger than those that are neutral.
Thereafter, we discuss the possibility of refining anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCRs
by replacing neutrality with consequential neutrality and deliver a possibility result under
certain conditions (Theorem 5). We also identify some cases where these conditions are not
satisfied but there exist anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs (Theorem 6). These positive
results do not hold over all conceivable social choice problems: we point to instances where
anonymity, consequential neutrality, efficiency, and resoluteness turn out to be incompatible
(Theorem 7). These are instances where the incompatibility prevails even without efficiency.
However, even in those cases, anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs exist. In fact, we are
able to identify a large class of social choice problems, namely those where the number of
alternatives exceeds the number of individuals, for which anonymity, consequential neutrality,
and resoluteness are compatible (Theorem 9).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives basic notation and notions. Section 3
delivers a generalization of the classical result on incompatibility of anonymity, neutrality,
and efficiency with resoluteness and proposes a refinement method towards resoluteness.
Section 4 introduces consequential neutrality and presents our more permissive results when
it replaces neutrality. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic notions and notation
Writing N for the set of natural numbers and picking m,n ∈ N {1}, we conceive a social
choice problem as a set A of alternatives with #A = m and a set N of individuals with
#N = n. We refer to (m,n) as the size of the social choice problem (A,N). Writing L(X)
for the set of linear orders, i.e., complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relations on
a given set X, let Pi ∈ L(A) denote the preference of i ∈ N .2 An n−tuple of such individual
2So, given any distinct x, y ∈ A and Pi ∈ L(A), precisely one of xPiy and yPix holds. Moreover, xPiy
and yPiz implies xPiz for all x, y, z ∈ A and Pi ∈ L(A).
3
preferences indicates a x(preference) profile PN ∈ L(A)N . A social choice rule (SCR) is a
mapping f : L(A)N → A, where A = 2A {∅} is the set of non-empty subsets of A.
Given any two sets S and T , we write S ⊆ T whenever S is a subset of T and S ⊂ T
whenever S is a proper subset of T . We let PN |B denote the restriction of PN ∈ L(A)N to
those alternatives in B ∈ A so that PN |B ∈ L(B)N and xPiy ⇐⇒ xPi|By for all x, y ∈ B
and i ∈ N . Given any two SCRs f1 and f2, we define the composite SCR f1f2 : L(A)N → A
such that f1f2(PN) = f1(PN |f2(PN )) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N . Given any two SCRs f1 and f2, we
say that f2 refines f1 iff f2(PN) ⊆ f1(PN) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N and f2(P ′N) ⊂ f1(P ′N) for some
P ′N ∈ L(A)N . An SCR f is resolute whenever #f(PN) = 1 ∀PN ∈ L(A)N . For a resolute
SCR f , we write f(PN) = x in place of f(PN) = {x}.
We now define two equal treatment conditions that are at the core of our anaysis. For
any non-empty finite set X, a permutation on X is a bijection σ : X ↔ X. Let ΣX be the set
of all permutations on X. We write, by a slight abuse of notation, σ(PN) = (Pσ(i))i∈N for the
profile obtained from PN ∈ L(A)N by a permutation σ ∈ ΣN on N . An SCR is anonymous
iff f(PN) = f(σ(PN)) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N ∀σ ∈ ΣN . Again, by an abuse of notation, we write
σ(Pi) for the preference obtained from Pi ∈ L(A) by a permutation σ ∈ ΣA on A, i.e., x Pi
y ⇐⇒ σ(x) σ(Pi) σ(y) ∀x, y ∈ A. Moreover, σ(PN) = (σ(Pi))i∈N ∀PN ∈ L(A)N . An SCR
is neutral iff x ∈ f(PN) ⇐⇒ σ(a) ∈ f(σ(PN)) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N , ∀x ∈ A, and ∀σ ∈ ΣA.
We close the section by noting that an SCR f is efficient iff given any PN ∈ L(A)N and
any x ∈ f(PN), @y ∈ A\{x} with y Pi x ∀i ∈ N .
3 Anonymous, neutral, and efficient social choice
Given any k, l ∈ N, we write k | l whenever k divides l, i.e., l
k
∈ N, and k - l otherwise. Let
D(n) = {k ∈ N : k | n} for the set of divisors of n ∈ N while D∗(n) = {k is a prime : k | n}∪
{1} is the set consisting of prime divisors of n as well as 1. Thus, D∗(n) ⊆ D(n) for
all n ∈ N. For any m,n ∈ N, the set of divisors of n that do not exceed m is denoted
Dn,m = {d ∈ D(n) : d ≤ m} and similarly D∗n,m = {d ∈ D∗(n) : d ≤ m}. Again,
D∗n,m ⊆ Dn,m for all m,n ∈ N. Imposing D∗n,m = {1} is shown by Moulin (1980) to be
a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice problem to admit an anonymous,
neutral, efficient, and resolute SCR.
Theorem 1 (Moulin (1980)) A social choice problem (A,N) with size (m,n) admits an
anonymous, efficient, neutral, and resolute SCR f : L(A)N → A if and only if D∗n,m = {1}.
The condition D∗n,m = {1} in Theorem 1 can be replaced by Dn,m = {1}.3 We will refer
3Having already noted D∗n,m ⊆ Dn,m, we now remark that D∗n,m = {1} =⇒ Dn,m = {1} for all m,n ∈ N.
To see this, let k ∈ Dn,m\{1}. Thus, we have k ∈ D(n) and k ≤ m. Due to the fundemantal theorem of
arithmetics, k has a prime divisor k∗, which divides n as well, hence k∗ ∈ D∗n,m, impying D∗n,m 6= {1}.
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to Dn,m = {1} as Condition µ(m,n).4
Theorem 1 gives a complete picture of the sizes of social choice problems where irres-
oluteness is inevitable but is silent about the structure of irresoluteness in such cases. To
analyze this, we define Kf = {#f(PN) : PN ∈ L(A)N} as the irresoluteness structure of
SCR f . So for any natural number k ≤ m, we have k ∈ Kf if and only if there exists a
profile to which f assigns precisely k alternatives.
Theorem 2 Take any social choice problem (A,N) with size (m,n).
i . An SCR f : L(A)N → A is anonymous, efficient, and neutral only if Kf ⊇ Dn,m.
ii . There exists an anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR f : L(A)N → A with Kf =
Dn,m.
Proof :
i. Take any d ∈ Dn,m. As d ∈ D(n), n = d×t for some t ∈ N. Take any set of alternatives
{a1, . . . , ad} ⊆ A and any partition {S1, . . . , Sd} of N with #Si = t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Let
X = A\{a1, . . . , ad}. Note that X may be empty. Now construct a profile PN as depicted
below:5
S1 S2 S3 · · · Sd
a1 a2 a3 · · · ad
. . . · · · a1
. . . · · · .
. . . · · · .
. . ad · · · ad−3
. ad a1 · · · ad−2
ad a1 a2 · · · ad−1
X X X · · · X
As f is efficient, f(PN) ⊆ {a1, . . . , ad}. Note that when d = 1, this implies #f(PN) = 1,
hence d ∈ Kf . Now let d > 1. Consider the permutation σ of A such that
σ(ai) = ai+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1},
σ(ad) = a1, and
σ(x) = x ∀x ∈ X.
4This condition is equivalent to asking the greatest common divisor of m! and n to be 1, as shown by
Dog˘an and Giritligil (2015), who reconsider the problem through a group theoretic approach. Interestingly,
as Dog˘an and Giritligil (2015) as well as Bubboloni and Gori (2014) show, gcd(m!, n) = 1 turns out to be
necessary and sufficient for the existence of anonymous and neutral social welfare functions (i.e., functions
which assign to every preference profile a strict ranking of alternatives).
5PN is such that aiPjai+1 · · · adPja1 · · · ai−2Pjai−1Pjx1Pj . . . Pjxm−d for all j ∈ Si and for all i ∈
{1, . . . , d}, where X = {x1, . . . , xm−d}.
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Next, let σ′ : N ↔ N be such that σ′(i) = i − t for all i ∈ {t + 1, . . . , dt = n} and
σ′(i) = (d− 1)t+ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Note that σ(PN) = σ′(PN).
Now, by neutrality, ai ∈ f(PN) implies σ(ai) ∈ f(σ(PN)). By anonymity, ai ∈ f(PN)
implies ai ∈ f(σ(PN)). Clearly, this is only possible when f(PN) = {a1, . . . , ad}. Hence,
#f(PN) = d, thus d ∈ Kf .
ii. Let τ(x, PN) = # {i ∈ N : xPiy ∀y ∈ A\{x}} denote the number of individuals that
rank x on top of their preferences in the profile PN . Define the plurality rule Υ : L(A)N → A
so that
Υ(PN) = {x ∈ A : τ(x, PN) ≥ τ(y, PN) ∀y ∈ A\{x}}.
Let us now define the iterative plurality rule υ : L(A)N → A, which selects the plurality win-
ners after successive restriction of profiles to plurality winners. Let Υ2(PN) = Υ(PN |Υ(PN )),
Υ3(PN) = Υ(PN |Υ2(PN )), and so on. Thus, we have
υ(PN) = Υ
k(PN)
for the minimal k ∈ N that satisfies Υk(PN) = Υk+1(PN). Such an integer always exists
given the finiteness of m. It is straightforward to see that υ is anonymous, efficient, and
neutral. We will show that Kυ = Dn,m for all n,m ∈ N. By definition, for any x, y ∈ A and
any PN ∈ L(A)N , x, y ∈ υ(PN) implies τ(x, PN |Υk(PN )) = τ(y, PN |Υk(PN )) = t for some t ∈ N.
Thus, we have #υ(PN)× t = n, implying Kυ ⊆ D(n). As #υ(PN) ≤ m, in fact, Kυ ⊆ Dn,m.
Given part (i) of the theorem, we have Kυ = Dn,m. 
Theorem 2 generalizes Theorem 1, which now comes as a corollary: when Condition
µ(m,n) fails, by Theorem 2.i , every anonymous, efficient, neutral, and resolute SCR has
#f(PN) > 1 for some PN ∈ L(A)N and when Condition µ(m,n) is satisfied, the itera-
tive plurality rule υ ensures the existence of an anonymous, efficient, and neutral f with
#f(PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ L(A)N .
As a matter of fact, Theorem 2 establishes that the irresoluteness structure Kυ of the
iterative plurality rule is the best that an anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR can achieve.
To be sure, this does not mean that υ cannot be refined while preserving anonymity, neu-
trality, and efficiency. But surely, any anonymous, efficient, and neutral refinement of υ will
have the same irresoluteness structure as υ. Moreover, as we formally state in the next the-
orem, any anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR whose irresoluteness structure is a proper
superset of Kυ can be refined while anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are preserved.
Theorem 3 Given a social choice problem (A,N) with size (m,n), an anonymous, efficient,
and neutral SCR f : L(A)N → A with Kf ⊃ Kυ admits an anonymous, efficient, and neutral
refinement g : L(A)N → A with Kg = Kυ.
Proof :
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Take any social choice problem (A,N) and any anonymous, efficient, and neutral f :
L(A)N → A with Kf ⊃ Kυ. By definition, we have υf(PN) ⊆ f(PN) for all PN ∈ L(A)N .
Take any profile P ′N ∈ L(A)N such that #f(P ′N) /∈ Kυ. As #υf(P ′N) ∈ D(n) by definition of
υ, we cannot have υf(P ′N) = f(P
′
N). Thus, υf(P
′
N) ⊂ f(P ′N). Furthermore, as #υf(P ′N) ≤
m, we have #υf(P ′N) ∈ Dn,m = Kυ. 
As an instance of Theorem 3, consider the social choice problem A = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2},
and PN ∈ L(A)N with xP1yP1z and zP2yP2x. For the Borda rule β, which chooses the
alternatives that have the minimal sum of ranks over individuals, we have β(PN) = {x, y, z},
thus 3 ∈ Kβ, while one can check that Kυ = {1, 2}, and, indeed, the composite rule υβ,
which gives υβ(PN) = {x, z} ⊂ β(PN), refines β and is anonymous, efficient, and neutral.
Theorem 3 points to the possibility of shrinking the irresoluteness structure of an anony-
mous, efficient, and neutral SCR f down to Kυ by composing f with υ, while υf preservers
all three properties. However, this does not mean that υf can refine f at every PN ∈ L(A)N
with f(PN) ⊃ υ(PN). To see this, let m = 5 and n = 6, and consider the following profile
PN .
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
x x t r y y
y y z z x x
z z x y r z
r t y x z t
t r r t t r
We have υ(PN) = {x, y} and ϕ(PN) = {x, y, z}, where ϕ denotes the fallback bargaining rule.6
However, the composite rule υϕ does not refine ϕ at this profile, i.e., υϕ(PN) = {x, y, z}.
4 Consequential neutrality
Let Wf (x) = {PN ∈ L(A)N : f(PN) = x} be the set of all profiles at which x is chosen
under a resolute SCR f . A resolute SCR f : L(A)N → A is consequentially neutral (CN)
iff #Wf (x) = #Wf (y) for all x, y ∈ A. Given any m,n ∈ N\{1}, we write FCNm,n for the
6Define, for any PN ∈ L(A)N , α(PN , x, k) = #{i ∈ N : #{y ∈ A\{x} : xPiy} ≥ k}, which gives the
number of individuals that rank x higher than at least k alternatives. Now, define the fallback bargaining
rule ϕ : L(A)N → A so that, ∀x ∈ A, x ∈ ϕ(PN ) if and only if
max
k∈{0,...,m−1}
{k ∈ N : α(PN , x, k) = n} ≥ max
k∈{0,...,m−1}
{k ∈ N : α(PN , y, k) = n}
for all y ∈ A\{x}.
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set of resolute SCRs that are CN; FNEUTRALm,n for the set of resolute and neutral SCRs; and
FRESOLUTEm,n for the set of resolute SCRs.
We say that P ′N is a renaming (for alternatives) of PN iff there exists σ ∈ ΣA such
that P ′N = σ(PN). We write PNρP
′
N when P
′
N is a renaming of PN . Noting that ρ ⊆
L(A)N×L(A)N is an equivalence relation, we write E for the partition of L(A)N provided by
ρ. Thus, each profile PN admits m! renamings. Moreover, #L(A)N = m!n. Thus, E admits
m!n−1 equivalence classes, each of which contains m! profiles. We write E = {Ei}i∈{1,...,m!n−1}
with #Ei = m! for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m!n−1}.
Proposition 1 FNEUTRALm,n ⊂ FCNm,n for all m,n ∈ N\{1}.
Proof : Let A = {x1, . . . , xm}. Take any f ∈ FNEUTRALm,n , any Et ∈ E , and any PN ∈ Et,
with f(PN) = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let
E ijt = {P ′N ∈ Et : P ′N = σ(PN) for some σ ∈ ΣA with σ(xi) = xj}.
Note that for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, {E ijt }j∈{1,...,m} partitions Et. By neutrality, we have f(P ′N) =
xj for all P
′
N ∈ E ijt , which implies #{PN ∈ Et : f(PN) = xj} = #{PN ∈ Et : f(PN) = xk} for
all j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. As t ∈ {1, . . . ,m!n−1} is chosen arbitrarily, #Wf (xj) = #Wf (xk).
To show the strictness of the inclusion, fix a profile P¯N ∈ L(A)N . Take the permutation
σ ∈ ΣA such that σ(x1) = x2, σ(x2) = x1, and σ(xj) = xj for all j ∈ {3, . . . ,m}. Take
any partition P = {P1, . . . ,Pm} of L(A)N such that #Pi = #Pj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and P¯N , σ(P¯N) ∈ P1. Define f : L(A)N → A such that f(PN) = xi for all PN ∈ Pi and
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By construction, f is CN. However, it fails neutrality as f(P¯N) = x1 =
f(σ(P¯N)). 
Proposition 1 raises the following two issues: How large is FCNm,n compared to FNEUTRALm,n
and which interesting resolute SCRs, if any, does it contain? We address the first question
through a counting approach.
Theorem 4 The following equalities hold.
i. #FRESOLUTEm,n = m(m!n).
ii. #FNEUTRALm,n = m(m!n−1).
iii. #FCNm,n = (m!
n)!m!
(m!n−1(m−1)!)!m .
Proof :
i. This is straightforward, as we noted before that #L(A)N = m!n.
ii. Take any Et ∈ E and pick any PN ∈ Et. Let f(PN) = x for some x ∈ A. Neutrality,
together with the definition of Et, determines f(P ′N) for any P ′N ∈ Et. Hence there are m
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neutral and resolute SCRs that can be defined on Et. As t ∈ {1, . . . ,m!n−1}, there are
m(m!
n−1) neutral and resolute SCRs altogether.
iii. First observe that, given any two natural numbers p and q, there are (pq)!
q!p
ways
to partition a set of cardinality pq into p sets, each with cardinality q. Hence, there are
(m!n)!
(m!n−1(m−1)!)!m ways to partition L(A)N with cardinality m!n into m sets, each with cardinality
m!n/m = m!n−1(m− 1)!. For each of these ways, m! distinct resolute SCRs can be defined.
As a result, (m!
n)!
(m!n−1(m−1)!)!m ×m! resolute SCRs that satisfy consequential neutrality can be
constructed. 
From Theorem 4, one can compute
#FNEUTRALm,n
#FRESOLUTEm,n = m
(−1+ 1
m!
)m!n . As 1
m!
< 1 for all m > 1,
this ratio approaches to 0 as m → ∞ or n → ∞. Thus, we conclude that the ratio of the
number of neutral and resolute SCRs to the number of all resolute SCRs is negligible in the
limit. Although we do not have analytical solutions for the comparisons regarding conse-
quential neutrality, we obtained some numerical observations through computations for small
values of m and n that are provided in Appendix A. These indicate that both
#FCNm,n
#FRESOLUTEm,n
and
#FCNm,n
#FNEUTRALm,n converge to 0, as m or n increases. Thus, although consequential neutral-
ity and neutrality are both hard to satisfy, neutrality seems to be considerably demanding
compared to consequential neutrality.7
Now we address whether FCNm,n\FNEUTRALm,n contains interesting SCRs and the answer is
affirmative, at least for certain sizes of the social choice problem.
We say that (m,n) satisfies Condition γ(m,n) iff m | (m
k
)
for all k ∈ Dn,m. This condition,
conjoined with m - n, ensures the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs,
as shown in the following theorem. As a piece of notation we use in the proof of the theorem,
let W¯f (x, k) = {PN ∈ L(A)N : x ∈ f(PN) and #f(PN) = k} denote the number of profiles
at which x is chosen by f in a tie of k alternatives.
Theorem 5 Let (A,N) be a social choice problem with size (m,n) where m - n and Con-
dition γ(m,n) is satisfied. Every anonymous and neutral SCR f : L(A)N → A admits
a resolute refinement which is anonymous and CN. Furthermore, when f is efficient, this
refinement preserves efficiency.
Proof : Fix m,n ∈ N as such, let A = {x1, . . . , xm}, and take any anonymous and neutral
f : L(A)N → A. Clearly, υf(PN) ∈ Dn,m for all PN ∈ L(A)N due to Theorems 2 and 3.
Given neutrality, we have #W¯υf (x, k) = #W¯υf (y, k) for all x, y ∈ A. As m - n, there does
not exist a profile PN with υf(PN) = A. For any k ∈ Dn,m\{1}, denote with Ak the subsets
of A with precisely k elements. So we have #Ak =
(
m
k
)
= m×((m−1
k−1
)
/k
)
. Condition γ(m,n)
7 We are providing computational results for only some small values of m and n because as m and n
increase, these values grow dramatically. As diminution in the ratios are also fast, these values appear to be
sufficient for this conclusion.
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ensures that
(
m−1
k−1
)
/k (= t from now on) is a natural number. Now, we need to show that to
each xi ∈ A, we can assign t distinct sets of cardinality k that contains xi. To do that, we
introduce the following iterative approach:
Step 0.
Take the first t sets in the lexicographic order of Ak (so starting with {x1, . . . , xk},
{x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1}, and so on). We denote with Ak,1 the set of these t sets.
Step 1.
Define σ : A ↔ A such that σ(xi) = xi−1 for all i ∈ {2 . . . ,m} and σ(xi) = xm. Now,
order the set Ak\Ak,1 lexicographically based on its image under σ and denote the set of the
first t of these sets with Ak,2.
Step 2.
Now, order the set Ak\Ak,1∪Ak,2 lexicographically based on its image under σ2 (two-time
application of σ, so that, for instance σ2(x1) = xm−1, σ2(x2) = xm, and so on) and denote
the set of the first t of these sets with Ak,3.
Steps 3 to m− 1 (if m ≥ 3) complete the process for assigning each of m alternatives to
all sets with k alternatives chosen under υf . We now ascertain that xi ∈ S for all S ∈ Ak,i
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, which we show in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 xi ∈ S for all S ∈ Ak,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof :
Take any xi ∈ A. The number of sets with k elements that include xi is
(
m−1
k−1
)
. The
maximum number of times xi can appear in sets S ∈ Ak,j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i−1} is (i−1)×t,
i.e., when each of them contains xi. We have i × t = i ×
((
m−1
k−1
)
/k
) ≤ (m−1
k−1
)
, for if each of
S ∈ Ak,j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} contains xi, then we have i ≤ k. Thus, as xi ∈ S for all
S ∈ Ak,i because xi is on top of the lexicographic order of each set in S ∈ A\
⋃
j≤i−1Ak,j
with xi ∈ S, under the image of σi−1, we have the desired result. 
We now define a resolute SCR g : L(A)N → A that refines υf . So, g(PN) = υf(PN)
for all PN ∈ L(A)N with #υf(PN) = 1. Moreover, υf(PN) ∈ Ak,i =⇒ g(PN) = xi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and PN ∈ L(A)N . g is a resolute refinement of f . Naturally, g is anonymous
as f is. Furthermore, by construction, it is CN. Finally, if f is efficient, g is efficient as well.

To see how the refinement in Theorem 5 can be constructed, consider the following
example with A = {x1, . . . , x5} and n = 6. Take any f that is anonymous, efficient, and
neutral. We have D6,5 = {1, 2, 3}. Take k = 3. We have
(
5
3
)
/5 = 10 and t = 2, that is, there
are 10 sets with three alternatives and all profiles that result in three alternatives under υf
will be assigned to each of the 5 alternatives so that each will be chosen in 2 different sets.
So in Step 0, we set A3,1 = {{x1, x2, x3}, {x1, x2, x4}} and so on as below.
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Step 0 : A3,1 = {{x1, x2, x3}, {x1, x2, x4}}
Step 1 : A3,2 = {{x2, x3, x4}, {x2, x3, x5}}
Step 2 : A3,3 = {{x3, x4, x5}, {x3, x4, x1}}
Step 3 : A3,4 = {{x4, x5, x1}, {x4, x5, x2}}
Step 4 : A3,5 = {{x5, x1, x2}, {x5, x1, x3}}
Note that, for instance, {{x3, x4, x5}, {x3, x4, x1}} = A3,3, because in Step 2 we have
σ2(x3) = x1, σ
2(x4) = x2, σ
2(x5) = x3,
σ2(x3) = x1, σ
2(x4) = x2, σ
2(x1) = x4,
which makes them the top two sets in the lexicographic order based on the image of σ2.
So for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have g(PN) = xi for all PN ∈ L(A)N such that υf(PN) ∈
A3,i. To check that this can be done for k = 2 as well is left to the reader.
Note that Condition γ(m,n) ensures the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and
resolute SCRs by asking m | (m
k
)
to hold for every k ∈ Dn,m. On the other hand, as it follows
from the proof of Theorem 5, a weaker version of Condition γ(m,n) that asks m | (m
k
)
to hold for some k ∈ Dn,m, although does not ensure resoluteness, allows the existence of
anonymous, CN, and efficient refinements. We state this formally in the following remark
and leave out its proof as it follows from the proof of Theorem 5.
An SCR f : L(A)N → A is CN iff for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have #W¯f (x, k) = #W¯f (y, k)
for all x, y ∈ A.8 Let us say that (m,n) satisfies Condition γ′(m,n) iff m | (m
k
)
for some
k ∈ Dn,m.
Remark 1 Let (A,N) be a social choice problem with size (m,n) where m - n and Condition
γ′(m,n) is satisfied. Every anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR f : L(A)N → A admits
a refinement which is anonymous, efficient, and CN .
How restrictive is Condition γ(m,n)? Note that when m is a prime, Condition γ(m,n)
is satisfied.9 Thus, anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs exist when m is prime and
does not divide n. Campbell and Kelly (2015) show that when n has at least two distinct
prime factors, there can only be finitely many values of m for which there are anonymous,
neutral, and resolute SCRs. Our result implies, for instance, that for such n, there are
infinitely many values of m (such as all primes that are greater than n) for which there are
anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs. Furthermore, these SCRs can be efficient.
To expand the picture drawn by Theorem 5, we show that m - n and Condition γ(m,n)
are not necessary for the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs. As a
8Note that for a resolute and CN SCR f , we have #W¯f (x, 1) = #W¯f (y, 1) for all x, y ∈ A and
#W¯f (x, k) = 0 for all x ∈ A and for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
9To see this, note that the numerator in
(
m
k
)
= m×···×(m−k+1)k! is divisible by m whereas none of {2, . . . , k}
divides m.
11
matter of fact, the theorem below spans some instances where Condition γ(m,n) fails, e.g.,
m = 4 and n = 2 (note that 2 ∈ D2,4 and 4 -
(
4
2
)
).
Theorem 6 Any social choice problem (A,N) with m ≥ 4 and n ∈ {2, 3} admits an anony-
mous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCR.
Proof : Let m ≥ 4 and N = {1, 2}. For any x, y ∈ A, let Txy ⊂ L(A)N denote the set
of profiles where individual 1 ranks x first and individual 2 ranks y first. Hence {Txy}x 6=y
partitions the set of profiles where there is no unanimously top ranked alternative. Given
any x, y ∈ A, note that
Tyx = {(Q,P ) ∈ L(A)N : (P,Q) ∈ Txy},
and hence, #Txy = #Tyx. Now, let A = {x1, . . . , xm} and define for any distinct i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, Dm(i, j) ={
k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}\{i, j} : k 6= l, k < t, and l < t ∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}\{i, j, k, l}},
as the doubleton that contains the lowest two indices in A excluding i and j. Let g :
L(A)N → A be a resolute SCR that picks at any profile the alternative that is ranked first
by both individuals, if exists. Furthermore, let g(PN) = xi if xkP1xl ⇐⇒ xkP2xl and
g(PN) = xj otherwise for all PN ∈ Txixj with i < j and Dm(i, j) = {k, l}. Hence, we have
#{PN ∈ Txixj : g(PN) = xi} = #{PN ∈ Txixj : g(PN) = xj} for all xi, xj ∈ A such that
i < j. Furthermore, let g(P,Q) = g(Q,P ) ∀(P,Q) ∈ L(A)N , so that g retains anonymity.
Finally, as g picks an alternative only if it is ranked first by an individual, it is also efficient.
Now let n = 3. Under plurality rule, ties occur only when each individual has a distinct
alternative as most preferred. This is the case for ((m− 1)!)3 profiles, which is divisible by
3 for all m ≥ 4, hence we can assign each of the three alternatives that appear on top to an
equal number of profiles. 
At this stage, one may be tempted to ask whether one can find an anonymous, CN,
efficient, and resolute SCR at any (m,n). The following theorem advises caution on this.
Theorem 7 There exists a social choice problem which admits no anonymous, CN, efficient,
and resolute SCR.
Proof : Let A = {x, y} and N = {1, 2}. We have four possible profiles, PN , P ′N , P ′′N , P ′′′N as
shown below.
P1 P2
x x
y y
P ′1 P
′
2
y y
x x
P ′′1 P
′′
2
x y
y x
P ′′′1 P
′′′
2
y x
x y
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Efficiency implies choosing x at PN and y at P
′
N . Moreover, f(P
′′
N) = f(P
′′′
N ) by anonymity.
Hence, #{PN ∈ L(A)N : f(PN) = x} 6=#{PN ∈ L(A)N : f(PN) = y}, a failure of conse-
quential neutrality. 
Nevertheless, the social choice problem in the proof of Theorem 7 admits an anonymous,
CN, and resolute SCR.10 This raises the question of how general is the compatibility between
anonymity and consequential neutrality when we dispense with the efficiency condition.
Moulin (1991) introduces the following condition that we call ψ(m,n). Let D(n)\{1} =
{d1, . . . , dK} for some K ∈ N.
Condition ψ(m,n): @(a1, . . . , aK) ∈ (N ∪ {0})K such that
∑K
i=1 aidi = m.
Remark 2 µ(m,n) =⇒ ψ(m,n) for all n,m ≥ 2.
The following theorem states the cases of incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in
resolute social choice.
Theorem 8 (Moulin (1991)) There exists an anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCR if
and only if ψ(m,n) holds.
We are now ready to state and prove our final theorem, which shows that if m > n, there
exist anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs for any social choice problem with size (m,n).
Note that for any n, there are infinitely many values of m that satisfy m > n.
Theorem 9 For all social choice problems with n < m, there exists an anonymous, CN,
and resolute SCR.
Proof : Given any preference profile, we observe k distinct preferences for some k ∈
{1, . . . ,min{m!, n}}. There are (m!
k
)
ways to choose k preferences from L(A). Let P =
{p1, . . . , pk} be a set of k distinct preferences. Write V k for the set of vectors v = (v1, . . . , vk)
with vi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
∑k
i=1 vi = n. Each v ∈ V k, combined with P, induces a
set of profiles EPv that consists of all profiles where p
i appears vi times for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Let EP =
⋃
v∈V k E
P
v . Three remarks are in order. First, #E
P depends on k and not on
the preferences in P. Second, an SCR f that satisfies at any given k ∈ {1, . . . ,min{m!, n}}
and P the invariance f(PN) = f(P
′
N) for all PN , P
′
N ∈ EP is anonymous. Third, m |
(
m!
k
)
if
k < m, which is ensured when n < m. Now, let tk =
(
m!
k
)
/m. Write A = {x1, . . . , xm} and
at each k ∈ {1, . . . ,min{m!, n}} assign to every xi tk distinct sets P = {p1, . . . , pk} and let
f(PN) = xi for all PN ∈ EP at every P assigned to xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By the three
remarks, f is anonymous, CN, and resolute. 
10 To see this, consider g : L(A)N → A such that g(PN ) = g(P ′N ) = x and g(P ′′N ) = g(P ′′′N ) = y, which is
both anonymous and CN while not efficient.
13
5 Conclusion
With an irresolute SCR that prevails, one cannot reach a collective choice without referring
to an additional mechanism that is external to the SCR. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 8
reflect the impossibility of making a collective choice by being confined to SCRs as collective
choice procedures. We take two different but related approaches to address how severe this
impossibility is.
First, we identify the minimal irresoluteness structure that would arise when anonymity,
efficiency, and neutrality make ties inevitable. Based on this analysis, we deliver a method
which, while preserving anonymity, efficiency, and neutrality, refines SCRs that deliver more
ties than necessary.
Next, we introduce consequential neutrality as a weakening of neutrality. As expected, we
obtain results that are more permissive than the (im-)possisibilities announced by Theorems 1
and 8. We identify a large class of social choice problems where resoluteness becomes possible
just because consequential neutrality replaces neutrality. Nevertheless, when efficiency is
preserved, we know that this possibility does not hold for every social choice problem.
Dispensing with efficiency presents a case of interest. We show that anonymous, CN,
and resolute social choice is possible when m > n. Although this condition is logically
independent of the necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem 8, it opens the door of
resoluteness to a large class of social choice problems that are doomed to irresoluteness by
Theorem 8. Moreover, we are not able to find any social choice problem where anonymity,
consequential neutrality, and resoluteness are incompatible. This provokes to ask whether
these three conditions are compatible for any size of the social choice problem, which we
leave as a –combinatorically difficult– open question.
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A Appendix: Observations on the numbers of CN,
neutral, and resolute SCRs
Tables 1 and 2 below show ratios the observations made in Section 4 are based on. In both
tables, 0 represents numbers smaller than 10−10mn.
#FNEUTRALm,n /#FCNm,n n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m = 2 0.333333 0.114286 0.00994561
m = 3 3.58965× 10−14 5.73212× 10−85 0
m = 4 0 0 0
Table 1. The ratio of #FNEUTRALm,n /#FCNm,n for different values of (m,n).
#FCNm,n/#Fm,n n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
m = 2 0.75 0.546875 0.392761 0.2799
m = 3 0.135304 0.0229012 0.0038267 0.000638057
m = 4 0.00175989 0.0000149993 1.27583× 10−7 1.08512× 10−9
m = 5 8.19334× 10−7 5.69061× 10−11 3.95181× 10−15 0
m = 6 8.12216× 10−12 0 0 0
Table 2. The ratio of #FCNm,n/#Fm,n for different values of (m,n).
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